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ow fully do we understand what other peoples 
say?‑  We usually assume humans broadly share *
ways of  perceiving and reasoning, so that 
translating and interpreting are about explaining 
the bits that fail to fit. On theoretical and 
ethnographic grounds I question whether matters 
are so straightforward. As a first step, I consider 
how people set about interpreting one another in 
Bali. As theoretical linguists claim that semantic 
theories work universally, I review how well they 
fare when confronted with ethnographic evidence. 
Their shortcomings are sufficient as to require an 
alternative, which I draw from Balinese categories 
and practices of  evaluating utterances and actions. 
If  Balinese have coherent, but quite different, ways 
of  interpreting one another, why should this not be 
so for other societies?  
There are good reasons for letting sleeping 
assumptions lie. Were understanding others to 
prove problematic, the implications would be 
grave, if  not shattering. As J.K. Galbraith put it: 
‘Faced with the choice between changing one’s 
mind and proving that there is no need to do so, 
almost everyone gets busy on the proof ’. Also a 
certain comfortable arrogance still permeates parts 
of  the human sciences. It is that the categories and 
procedures of  European thought are both 
necessary and sufficient (or near enough) to 
understand all human thoughts and actions.  1
!  Mark Hobart is Professor Emeritus of  Critical Media and Cultural Studies and founder of  the Centre for *
Media and Film Studies SOAS, University of  London.
!  As my object of  study is interpretive practices, I confine other issues to footnotes or references. Because my 1
concern is Balinese usage, I draw on the Oxford English dictionary for three terms—interpret, understand and 
translate. These overlap. ‘Interpret’ is defined by reference to both ‘translate’ and ‘understand’. I do not address 
different theories of  translation, understanding and interpretation in detail, as my main concern is to examine 
what Balinese do. The adequacy of  existing approaches to translation has been sufficiently problematized for my 
purposes by Quine 1960, Benjamin 1968 and Asad 1986; hermeneutics in general by Hirsch 1967; Palmer 
1969; Ricoeur 1981; Foucault 1970, 1990; and hermeneutics in Bali by Hobart 2000. My argument relies on 
Deleuze’s rejection of  the philosophical habit of  presupposing sameness rather than difference (1994). If  we start 
from the probability of  difference, life becomes more interesting and difficult.
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Abstract: Scholars generally assume that current Euro-American theory is both necessary and sufficient to 
understand other societies. Analyzing the presuppositions of  linguistic and anthropological models indicates 
however that they are fatally flawed. Examining Balinese practices of  speaking and understanding others 
shows they work with a consistently pragmatic approach with coherent modes of  interrogating situated 
utterances. Close study of  examples highlights how far existing theories from truth-conditional semantics to 
speech act theory not only fail to appreciate what is said and done, but insulate themselves from realizing this. 
So the many studies of  Balinese ‘symbolism’ are only possible by failing to listen to what people say. According 
to Balinese, speech is inseparable from other acts, so meaning can only be judged from its consequences. If  
other people have diverse ways of  speaking, acting and understanding, should we not finally lay aside our 
comfortable hegemony and inquire critically what is going on?
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Anthropology’s role here has been at best to 
question the presuppositions that inform such 
closure, at worst conservatively to justify such 
claims and to patrol the boundaries of  what is 
admissible. Arguments for or against the 
supremacy of  European thinking depend however 
precisely on such thinking. Whether this is 
potentially circular when invoked to understand 
how others live, it is certainly hegemonic (Laclau & 
Mouffe 1985). Leaving aside the cultural, 
historical, epistemological, political and even moral 
case for rethinking presuppositions forged during 
the colonial—or even pre-colonial—era, the 
question arises of  how to address double 
discursivity, which I take to be an inescapable issue 
for anthropology. By double discursivity I am 
referring to the co-existence of  two assemblages of  
presuppositions—those of  the analyst or current 
academic practice and those of  the people under 
investigation—that are not only distinct but at the 
least partly incommensurate.  2
The problem of  understanding others is often 
phrased as how we may know or translate their 
cultural categories. The response is usually that 
either we must assume a significant measure of  
congruity between discourses or else we must place 
limits on the kind of  cultural relativity allowable, 
because otherwise reasoned argument becomes 
impossible or, worse, others become unknowable. 
For a European-centred philosopher, such a stance 
might be defensible but only at the cost of  
circumscribing others’ thoughts and actions to 
what fits your own preferred ways of  working. If  
this sounds somewhat colonial or racist, perhaps it 
is because it is. 
What however is so wrong with existing 
approaches? Considered as a question of  primitive 
thought or rationality, as the so-called rationality 
debate made clear (Wilson 1970; Hollis & Lukes 
1982a; Overing 1985), a host of  diverse issues 
became sutured into a portmanteau problem. 
Furthermore proponents of  universal reason 
disagree among themselves as to what it is, how it 
works and to what it applies.  Anthropologists have 3
often preferred to phrase the issue as one of  
symbolism (Firth 1973; Geertz 1973; Sahlins 
1999). The choice is curious because the notion 
has so many different but overlapping senses as to 
leave the notion obfuscatory and largely 
incoherent (Sperber 1975). It is also ethnocentric in 
its overwhelming reliance on a historically and 
culturally specific, but little acknowledged, 
German Romantic account (Todorov 1982). The 
move to the idea of  ‘text’—at least in the hands of  
English-speaking scholars—risks reification by 
conflating an actual work with textuality, the 
conditions of  possibility of  writing and evaluating 
works (Derrida 1976; Barthes 1977).  
Perhaps we should ask on precisely what 
evidence are such broad claims about reason and 
symbolism based? Almost all focus on eye-catching 
epistemological problems that involve apparent 
breaches of  the laws of  thought or on ontological 
puzzles like twins being birds (Nuer) or a man 
being also a tiger (Temiar) or green cockatoo 
(Bororo). Few deal with how people set about 
understanding one another day-to-day. And fewer 
still inquire about what is presupposed in practice 
to make understanding possible—to the extent that 
in fact it is.  It is not self-evident how far such set 4
piece propositional puzzles work in the 
!  The problems of  different presuppositions with which Foucault wrestled using the notion of  discours (1972; 2
Deleuze 1994) are, I think, sufficiently cognate to those that Collingwood addressed as metaphysics (1940) as to 
be worth relating. In other words divergent discourses involve different metaphysics in action.
!  My thanks are due to the two anonymous reviewers of  this piece: one for encouraging the radical steps that I 3
am trying to take, the other for making it clear that I need to distinguish my approach from the ethnography of  
speaking.
!  Communication between interlocutors does not presuppose understanding, merely that they can locate each 4
others’ utterances in different equivalence structures (Wallace 1961). Under what circumstances do humans 
actually seek understanding, mutual or otherwise? And what exactly do we mean by understanding? I leave these 
issues to philosophers because what I need to establish is that it is viable to address understanding pragmatically. 
Try not to think of  understanding as a ‘mental process’ at all.—For that is the expression which confuses 
you. But ask yourself: in what sort of  case, in what kind of  circumstances, do we say ‘Now I know how to 
go on’ (Wittgenstein 1958: #154). 
Hermeneutics is not ‘another way of  knowing’—‘understanding’ as opposed to (predictive) 
‘explanation’. It is better seen as another way of  coping (Rorty 1980: 356).
Heidelberg Ethnology, Occasional Paper No.1
Beyond the Whorfs of  Dover	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	   !3
multifarious contexts of  use where claims about 
knowing are inevitable, because they involve rival 
representations of  events, motivations, personal 
interests, past histories, circumstances and 
relationships.  Set against the diverse, complex, 5
partly unknowable and undecidable maelstrom of  
quotidian life, attempts to extract ideal models look 
not just utopian and quaint, but verge on desperate 
acts of  denial. At which point it becomes open to 
quest ion whether interpretat ion is an 
unproblematic universal method rather than an 
assemblage of  practices, which underwrite 
cultural, class, gender, religious or other modes of  
hegemony.  
What would be required of  a study of  
everyday interpretive practice? Prima facie we 
might ask: how do people go about appreciating 
the range of  quotidian utterances and more formal 
statements? How do they judge whether an 
utterance needs interpretation or not? Are there 
recognized terms and procedures for such 
evaluation? Who commands these? And who is 
entitled to interpret? Is anyone? Or is 
interpretation deemed to require expert knowledge 
vested in a particular group such as priests, 
diviners, academics or bankers? How do such 
interpretive procedures differ from existing 
linguistic models? How does such an approach 
address the issue of  double discursivity? Before 
addressing these questions, I consider some 
relevant linguistic approaches to interpretation and 
meaning. This is not intended as a contribution to 
theoretical linguistics debates, but as a reflection on 
how adequate these are at explicating Balinese 
situated utterances and their interpretation. 
Some Problems 
Meaning and interpretation are treacherous 
issues, because so many disciplines lay unique 
claim to expert knowledge. How far can you go 
though without considering how people talk and 
judge what one another say without reference to 
the social contexts of  use? The conventional 
answer is that use is separate from, and 
dependent on, the formal conditions of  
intelligibility. To consider issues of  meaning in 
Balinese society, we need therefore briefly to 
review what linguists mean by semantics, ‘the 
study of  meaning’ (Lyons 1977: 1), which claims 
to be rigorous and systematic. An adequate 
theory of  semantics is usually expected to 
embrace the nature of  word and sentence 
meaning, predict ambiguities and explain the 
systematic relations between words and 
sentences as part of  a general theory of  
language.  How the subject matter is defined is 6
worth noting. Language is presumed to be 
s y s t e m at i c a n d t o h ave i d e n t i fi a b l e , 
unambiguous properties—an interestingly 
essentialist starting point. The assumption that 
both words and sentences have ‘meaning’ 
postulates, as the essence of  linguistic forms, 
u n n e c e s s a r y ‘ o b s c u r e i n t e r m e d i a r y 
entities’ (Quine 1953: 22). It all depends on 
what you mean by meaning (Hobart 1982). 
Arguably though anthropologists do not 
deal with semantics at all, but with pragmatics, 
or how speakers use sentences to convey 
messages whether directly linked to linguistic 
content or not.  Reddy has criticized the 7
presupposition that language ‘contains’ 
!  Such formal armchair speculation is abetted by ignoring that, in daily life, much is about knowing how (Ryle 5
1971) or even when (Cohen 1993) rather than knowing that.
!  This is taken from Kempson’s definition: 6
to have any claims to adequacy, a semantic theory must fulfil at least three conditions: (i) it must capture 
for any language the nature of  word meaning and sentence meaning, and explain the nature of  the 
relation between them; (ii) it must be able to predict the ambiguities in the forms of  a language, whether 
in words or sentences; (iii) it must characterize and explain the systematic relations between words and 
sentences of  a language—i.e. it must give some explicit account of  the relations of  synonymy, logical 
inclusion, entailment, contradiction etc. Any theory which fails to capture these relations, either at all, or 
in particular cases making the wrong predictions, must be inadequate, either in principle or in some 
detail of  the theory. There are also some general properties of  language which any part of  a general 
linguistic theory must take account of  (1977: 4).
!  For convenience I follow Kempson again.  7
The main aim of  such a theory is expected to be the explanation of  how it is that speakers of  any 
language can use the sentences of  that language to convey messages which do not bear any necessary 
relation to the linguistic content of  the sentence used. This type of  theory would also have to explain the 
relation between the use of  a sentence and the linguistic act (illocutionary act) which that sentence is 
used to perform (1977: 68-9).
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messages which it conveys as involving an 
unacknowledged and unnecessary ‘conduit 
metaphor of  language’ (1979). Precisely how the 
distinction is couched depends, of  course, on the 
theory in question (Lyons 1977: 115-17). If  
semantics ‘has, until recently, been the 
Cinderella of  linguistics’ (Kempson 1977: 2), 
pragmatics becomes the marmiton of  semantics, a 
scullery lad whose job is to deal with what 
semantics will not demean itself  to—or cannot
—touch.  
The distinction between semantics and 
pragmatics hinges on the supposedly essentially 
‘systematic’ nature of  language. Assuming 
natural languages have general grammatical 
properties ‘derives rather from the conceptual 
apparatus we impose upon these languages than 
from any remarkable affinit ies among 
them’ (Goodman 1972: 70). How then is 
semantics distinguished from pragmatics, 
language as system (langue, or language-system) 
from speech (parole, or language-behaviour, de 
Saussure 1974: 9; and Lyons 1977: 239 
respectively)? It is by separating ‘what is essential 
from what is accessory and more or less 
accidental’ (de Saussure 1974: 14). As so often 
with dichotomies, one category (language, 
semantics) is privileged and protected from 
incoherence by displacing whatever fails to fit 
into another category (speech, pragmatics). At a 
stroke language is defined so as to be systematic; 
and exceptions classified safely away. Dichotomy 
is a device whereby systematic and rationalist 
enterprises like theoretical linguistics achieve a 
closure that makes it seemingly immune to 
contrary evidence. There are parallels to the 
stance of  philosophers in the rationality debate. 
In both, theory is deployed to predetermine 
possible avenues of  inquiry and evidence. It is a 
neat way of  shoring up the epistemological 
superiority of  the Western academic machine.  
The Shade of  Whorf  
My summary reject ion of  exist ing 
approaches requires justification. Anthropologists 
among others often find the Sapir-Whorf  
hypothesis intuitively attractive. Let me start with 
the charges against ‘Whorfians’, those 
unscrupulous ruffians to be found leaning against 
empty oil drums smoking. As Sapir put it:  
Human beings do not live in the objective world 
alone, nor alone in the world of  social activity as 
ordinarily understood, but are very much at the 
mercy of  the particular language which has 
become the medium of  expression for their 
society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one 
adjusts to reality essentially without the use of  
language and that language is merely an 
incidental means of  solving specific problems of  
communication and reflection. The fact of  the 
matter is that the ‘real world’ is to a large extent 
unconsciously built up on the language habits of  
the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently 
similar to be considered as representing the same 
social reality. The world in which different 
societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the 
same world with different labels attached (1949: 
209).  
Although often regarded as a manifesto for 
linguistic determinism, closer scrutiny suggests 
Sapir’s ontology is more complicated. It involves 
overlapping classes (Collingwood 1933), the 
unconscious, contingency (incidental means), 
practice (adjusting to reality; solving problems; 
social habits) and representing as (Goodman 1968: 
27-31). Reading this as crude determinism 
requires some effort. 
The view that ideas are totally determined 
by language habits or covert classifications is as 
absurd as the view that language is merely a 
medium entirely transparent to reality or ideas. 
As both affirmation and denial of  the hypothesis 
are implausible, presumably something is wrong 
with the terms of  the debate. Both language and 
thinking can equally be construed as 
assemblages of  practices, not unproblematic 
essences or systems (Vološinov 1973; Bakhtin 
1986a). Short of  proposing naïve realism 
(Collingwood 1940: 34-48), how do we define 
reality independent of  some frame of  reference 
(Goodman 1978)? And what would a language-
free frame of  reference look like? The debate is 
shot through with dichotomies, often Cartesian
—between Mind or language versus the world, 
concepts or propositions versus reality, langue 
versus parole, ideal competence versus actual 
performance, semantics versus pragmatics—
which serve to fend off  the possibility that we 
are dealing with a world of  changing practice. 
At t imes, theory tur ns out to be 
impermeable to good sense. Max Black, 
reviewing the work of  Whorf  on Hopi 
distinctions between the manifest and 
unmanifest, accuses him of  the ‘linguist’s fallacy’ 
of  
imputing his own sophisticated attitudes to the 
speakers he is studying... How much of  all this 
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would the average Hopi recognize? Perhaps it 
might leave him as dumbfounded as a Greek 
peasant reading Aristotle (1962: 247, 251). 
While Whorf  may have fallen short of  
contemporary standards of  ethnography, the 
argument is permeated by a chilling sense of  the 
superiority of  the knower over the known. Do 
proponents of  Euro-American epistemologies 
still have to defend themselves by invoking the 
myth of  the stupid native? 
Critics of  rationalism and scientism also 
differ over alternative approaches to meaning. In 
Against Method, Feyerabend explicitly endorsed a 
modified Whorfian view of  language as not 
merely the instrument of  description, but as 
shaping events, because 
languages and the reaction patterns they involve 
are not merely instruments for describing events, 
but that they are also shapers of  events, that their 
‘ g r a m m a r ’ c o n t a i n s a c o s m o l o g y, a 
comprehensive view of  the world, of  society, of  
the situation of  man which influences thought, 
behaviour, perception (1975: 223, all emphases 
in the original, unless otherwise stated). 
Feyerabend added that major scientific theories 
are sufficiently general, ‘deep’ and complex as to 
merit consideration like natural languages. 
Theory cannot determine the nature of  
language because theory is a language. By 
contrast, although Quine argued that scientific 
theories are total and so self-confirming, he 
specified the problem as best approached not by 
generalizations about undifferentiated language 
per se but by recognizing that alternative 
translations are always possible.  We need 8
therefore to examine the presuppositions behind 
relevant semantic theories. 
Two approaches require consideration here: 
one because of  its grip upon linguists’ and 
philosophers’ imaginations, the other because it 
is a well worked out alternative pragmatic 
approach. The former is Truth-Conditional 
Semantics (Tarski 1956; Davidson 1967, 1969; 
Wiggins 1971); the latter is Relevance Theory 
(Sperber & Wilson 1982, 1986). Whereas 
Davidson grounds interpretation and translation 
in truth, Sperber and Wilson ground them 
ultimately in intention, a notoriously tricky 
notion.  As indicated, my concern is how 9
adequate these are at addressing what Balinese 
actually say. 
Davidson (drawing on the mathematician 
Tarski) defended a sophisticated version of  
Correspondence Theory, in which sentences 
have meaning by virtue of  being underwritten 
by a theory of  truth. So ‘to know the meaning 
of  a sentence is to know under what conditions 
that sentence would be true’ (Kempson 1977: 
23).  The role ascribed to anthropologists is 10
interesting.  
!  Quine’s position is as follows: 8
One frequently hears it urged that deep differences in language carry with them ultimate differences in 
the way one thinks, or looks upon the world. I would urge that what is most generally involved is 
indeterminacy of  correlation. There is less basis of  comparison—less sense in saying what is good 
translation and what is bad—the farther we get away from sentences with visibly direct conditioning to 
non-verbal stimuli and the farther we get off  home ground (1960: 77-8).  
Quine’s stress on visibly direct conditioning in turn needs modifying. Not least, as Gombrich (1960) pointed out, 
we learn to see. Developing Quine’s argument that explanations resemble translation manuals, Hesse has 
questioned the status of  prediction in science (1978) and whether literal language is possible at all (1984), both of  
which have implications for the theories of  language and meaning discussed below.
!  Anthropologists sometimes underestimate the relevance of  hermeneutics, which is curious granted the reliance 9
of  the doyen of  interpretive anthropologists, Clifford Geertz, on the work of  Ricoeur. My argument here follows 
the counter-argument exemplified by Foucault’s critique of  the implications for knowledge/power of  the 
inevitable closure of  European interpretive practices.
!  There are important differences between Truth-Conditional Semantics and Chomsky’s theory of  the deep 10
structure of  grammar such that, according to Hacking, both cannot be true (1975: 136-7). As I am not a 
philosopher of  language, I draw here upon Rorty and Hacking whose conclusions provide a good starting point 
for a practice-oriented approach. Hacking has a delightful story about the limits of  charity and humanity in 
translation. 
On their voyage of  discovery to Australia, a group of  Captain Cook’s sailors captured a young kangaroo 
and brought the strange creature back on board their ship. No one knew what it was, so some men were 
sent ashore to ask the natives. When the sailors returned they told their mates. ‘It’s a kangaroo.’ Many 
years later it was discovered that when the aborigines said ‘kangaroo’ they were not in fact naming the 
animal, but replying to their questioners, ‘What did you say?’ (1975: 150).
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The theory-builder must not be assumed to have 
direct insight into likely equivalences between his 
own tongue and the alien. What he must do is 
find out, however he can, what sentences the 
alien holds true in his own tongue (or better to 
what degree he holds them true). The linguist 
then will attempt to construct a characterization 
of  truth-for-the-alien which yields, so far as 
possible, a mapping of  sentences held true (or 
false) by the alien onto sentences held true (or 
false) by the linguist. Supposing no perfect fit is 
found, the residue of  sentences held true 
translated by sentences held false (and vice versa) 
is the margin for error (foreign or domestic). 
Charity in interpreting the words and thoughts 
of  others is unavoidable in another direction as 
well: just as we must maximize the agreement, or 
risk not making sense of  what the alien is talking 
about, so we must maximize the self-consistency 
we attr ibute to him, on pain of  not 
understanding him (Davidson 1971: 458). 
Several points deserve comment. First, the 
argument presupposes homogeneity of  a 
linguistic population summed up in the singular 
‘alien’ (cf. ‘the average Hopi’). Differences of  
class, ethnicity, gender, being relatively well or 
badly informed, knowing how things work etc. 
must all be declared irrelevant. Second, such a 
theory depends on the assumption that ‘most of  
the time most people must be trying to tell the 
truth, and that communication must be the 
primary role of  language’ (Hacking, 1975: 145). 
As this is an ideal rather than a demonstrable 
universal reality (just think of  academic politics), 
it has little use for analyzing actual, as against 
idealized, speech. Third, problems arise if  
notions of  truth are not identical or 
commensurable c ros s -cu l tura l l y. Thi s 
assumption underlies Hollis’ concept of  the 
‘bridgehead’ (1970). Were the aliens to have 
different and incommensurable criteria of  truth-
in-the-world, as I have argued do Balinese 
(1985), the minimal conditions for a Truth-
Conditional Semantic approach may be absent. 
Fourth, the approach requires a principle of  
charity, or humanity (Grandy 1973). But whose 
charity? It is, of  course, that of  Europeans, 
naturalized and exnominated (Barthes 1973: 
138-9) as a far-from-innocent ‘we’. In other 
words we must presuppose ‘the psychic unity of  
mankind’ and a theory of  human nature 
encapsulated in Strawson’s phrase ‘a massive 
central core of  human thinking which has no 
history’ (1959: 10; cited in Hollis 1982). The 
theory requires a universal account of  beliefs 
and wants. If  linguists must assume such unity, 
they not only paint themselves into a corner, but 
also paint the rest of  the world in the same 
colours. Certainly anthropologists might be 
unwise to do so, because arguments about 
human nature are germane to their analyses, as 
they are, at least in part, historically and 
culturally constituted (Collingwood 1946: 81-85; 
Wallace 1961: 29-44). Finally, note the curious 
use of  the spatial metaphor of  mapping 
sentences, which freezes the to-and-fro of  people 
speaking in all sorts of  different circumstances 
into an elegant tableau. Truth-Conditional 
Semantics may be less the guardian of  
translational law and order than a case of  Tarski 
and crutch.  
Are there alternatives? Sperber and Wilson 
outlined a pragmatic approach, which claims to 
address the kind of  utterances encountered by 
anthropologists. They argued that apparently 
irrational statements can be explained by logical 
inference from what is said. In so doing, 
invoking such troublesome notions as context or 
mutual knowledge (‘pre-text’ or ‘inter-text’) 
becomes unnecessary. All you need is an 
assumption that speakers strive to be relevant. 
Let me take their own example. 
Flag-seller: 	Would you like to buy a flag for the 
Royal National Lifeboat Institution? 
Passer-by:	 No thanks, I always spend my holidays 
with my sister in Birmingham.  
To understand this exchange, the hearer must 
supply (at least) the following premises. 
a. Birmingham is inland. 
b. The Royal National Lifeboat Institution is a 
charity. 
c. Buying a flag is one way of  subscribing to a 
charity. 
d. Someone who spends his holidays inland has 
no need of  the services of  the Royal National 
Lifeboat Institution. 
e. Someone who has no need of  the services of  
a charity cannot be expected to subscribe to 
that charity (1982: 73). 
Ostensible non-sequiturs make sense when you 
add the contextual implications that are 
necessary and sufficient to make sense of  the 
exchange. ‘A contextual implication of  an 
utterance is a non-trivial logical implication 
derivable not from the content of  the utterance 
Heidelberg Ethnology, Occasional Paper No.1
Beyond the Whorfs of  Dover	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	   !7
alone, nor from the context alone, but only from 
the context and content combined’ (1982: 73). 
The example cited is important because of  ‘the 
intuitive connection it reveals between being 
able to derive the contextual implications of  an 
utterance and being able to see its relevance... 
This sugges t s that having contextual 
implications in a given context is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for relevance, and can 
be used as the basis of  a definition of  
relevance’ (1982: 73). 
The approach is also supposed to clarify 
how problematic kinds of  interpretation like 
divination work. Put simply, anxious patients 
over-extend the context until they make sense of  
otherwise irrelevant remarks (1982: 84). Gellner 
(1970) had warned of  this danger in Evans-
Pritchard’s use of  contextual charity (1956). 
While it may be necessary for a theory of  
semantics to assume that humans always strive 
to tell the truth, Gellner made the telling point 
that, as language is often used to mislead, 
mystify, obscure issues and so on, we need to 
consider the workings of  language in practice, 
not just in theory. 
Interesting though Sperber and Wilson’s 
approach may be, it suffers grave defects.  11
Evidently much mutual knowledge cannot be 
inferred, like what is a charity, nor even that 
Birmingham is inland.  It can cope with neither 12
the plethora of  ways people use utterances, nor 
the possible consequences of  the utterances 
(their illocutionary and perlocutionary force 
respectively). In presuming that speakers intend 
to be relevant, the argument presupposes a 
universal definition of  intention—which has 
proven recalcitrant—and that universal criteria 
of  rationality and relevance may be established 
without circularity. And, as Hollis has argued, 
these must be defined a priori (1970, 1982). As 
Wolfram has pointed out, there is a gap between 
what people say and what may be inferred from 
their saying so. She notes that contradictory or 
false statements may be intentionally asserted 
without necessarily being irrational: ‘someone 
may assert p, which is false, as a kindness, a 
courtesy, a joke, to avoid a quarrel, to win a 
vote, to get a proposal accepted, to insult, 
provoke, bewilder, mislead and so on’ (1985: 76). 
Nor does it follow that because people consult a 
diviner they necessarily believe the unqualified 
efficacy of  the diviner or of  divination, or even 
in divination at all. There are many motives—
like wanting to please someone else, doing what 
is expected—for engaging in what you might 
have doubts about. Nor does it follow that, 
because a diviner knows something, a diviner 
knows everything, such that one must extend 
context until all information makes sense. Put 
simply, there are too many functions of  
language for communication to be reducible to 
the message and its inferences (Jakobson 1960). 
Universal applicability is achievable only by 
disguising the authors’ culturally specific 
presuppositions and by omitting all questions of  
how humans engage with one another in daily 
life.  
Balinese Terms for Truth and Meaning 
This lengthy preamble was necessary to 
clear the ground so we can examine how 
Balinese commonly address truth and 
interpretation. First I consider how their 
approaches to truth and meaning differ from the 
theories outlined. Then I explore how they set 
about interpreting different kinds of  utterances 
in daily life.  13
Balinese usually distinguish what is correct 
in discourse, patut, from what is true of  the 
world, wiakti. The former is used when you are 
talking of  a statement being accurately reported 
or coherent with other statements. It is closely 
!  Unfortunately Wilson ignominiously failed her own test. When presenting this piece as a seminar paper in 11
Oxford, one of  the participants, Peter Rivière, burst out laughing. He explained that at a seminar at University 
College London, Deirdre Wilson had professed herself  bewildered by what she had just heard from a flag-seller 
on Tottenham Court Road and had to have the exchange explained to her. 
!  It would be perfectly possible for Birmingham to be on the coast and the waters so calm that no vessel has 12
ever required a lifeboat. A questionable cultural presupposition about human nature as invariably selfish—
people never subscribe to charities from which they do not benefit—is smuggled in. Anyhow we need to know 
much more about charities, perceived self-advantage and so on than can conceivably be implied. 
!  I follow Bakhtin’s (e.g. 1986a) and Vološinov’s (1973) rejection of  language as a system in favour of  an 13
analysis based on unique utterances, which works particularly well for Bali given what seems their pragmatist 
inclination. In the late Sándor Hervey’s view, on my account, Balinese have an entirely coherent, strong 
pragmatist theory of  language use. 
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linked to manut, said of  words or actions that are 
fitting or appropriate to a given situation. By 
contrast, wiakti is what is manifest or evident.  14
To understand how wiakti is used, we need to 
appreciate the distinction between sakala, what is 
visible or manifest, and niskala, what is invisible 
or non-manifest. These are equivalent neither to 
the dichotomy of  present or absent, nor to true 
or false. The non-manifest may be present but 
invisible, even concealed in the visible. What is 
non-manifest may indeed not be the case, but it 
cannot be equated with untrue any more than 
not being patut is false. There seem to be 
interesting connections here between Balinese 
usage and Indian Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophical 
ideas (Potter 1977; Hobart 1985). That other 
coherent epistemologies exist rarely features in 
truth-conditional semantics. Such ignorance or 
dismissal suggest more reliance on faith and 
hope than on charity. 
Balinese have elaborate and widely shared 
ideas about reference and language. Briefly, 
words (keruna) refer or point (nudingang or nujuang) 
to what exists in sakala. As you cannot refer 
ostensively to what is not manifest, you can at 
best speak of  the non-manifest by analogy 
(ngimbayang) with the visible world, using 
conventional designations (parad) rather than 
proper names. As an aside, the word for proper 
name, and class name, is adan.  Speech is made 15
up of  utterances, which typically take the form 
of  sentences (lengkara). Balinese further 
distinguish between speech and writing.  16
Although respect is widely accorded to written 
works, what they signify remains a potentiality 
until someone actually reads them to an 
audience on some occasion for some purpose. 
To make a statement which is either 
incorrect or untrue is lying (mogbog). Interestingly 
this normally covers not just deliberate 
misleading (nguluk-uluk) but mistakes.  Leeway is 17
common when joking with friends, but you 
should be cautious with strangers and enemies. 
Insult therefore tends to take highly structured 
forms, such as masesimbing, where the effect is 
achieved by displacing the subject. For example 
you can make an insulting remark in the 
presence of  someone you dislike after 
deliberately bumping, say, into a dog or small 
child. However, ostensibly you swear at it, not at 
your intended target.  
Language (basa) is used with care, especially 
in public life. Balinese has several ranked lexical 
registers, or ‘language levels’, use of  which 
varies with the status of  the person or group 
addressed.  Misuse is a potentially serious 18
offence, which might even involve the costly 
repurification of  the offended party. (The 
stereotypic case is using demeaning language to 
a person of  high ‘caste’; but I know of  instances 
of  village wards exacting punishment—usually 
death—if  similarly abused, kapisuh.) Balinese 
consider language to be so efficacious that it can 
easily be used to mislead. If  asked to rank 
senses, informants almost always listed sight as 
the most reliable; and usually speech or hearing 
the least.  A striking feature of  Balinese speech 19
is how carefully statements are often qualified. 
!  The Sanskrit and Kawi is wyakti, ‘visible appearance, becoming evident or known… evidence, proof, 14
clarification, explanation’; also related to wahya ‘outwardly visible, pertaining to the senses’. These glosses are 
from Zoetmulder 1982, from whom I take subsequent translations in Sanskrit and Kawi. 
!  Balinese sometimes argued that the etymology was from ada, to exist, the genitive suffix ‘-n’, so making it 'the 15
existing/existence of'. In that case to name something would be to affirm its existence. However this is a folk 
etymology with all its implications.
!  Spoken utterance, raos, always excludes what is written, sané katulis, cf. Kawi tulis ‘painting, drawing, writing, 16
letter’, ‘with the outward form of ’, also ‘a model’ in the sense of  a particularly good or beautiful instance of  
something. For further discussion of  naming and Balinese interpretive vocabulary respectively see Hobart 1984, 
2000.
!  This is in keeping with a tendency to avoid assertions or judgements about human, let alone divine, intentions 17
which, being niskala are difficult, if  not impossible, to know. So they tend to stress what happened, or the ‘truth’ 
or ‘falsity’ of  statements. For a more detailed discussion of  the categories of  niskala and sakala see Hobart 1985.
!  Most of  the words and expressions introduced here are singgih (high) Balinese, because that was the register 18
that people mostly used to talk about such matters. Several terms are drawn from Kawi (the textual language of  
Old Javanese), which is in effect another register used by older or more articulate speakers.
!  The resulting scepticism towards reported information creates a problem about written texts. The problem is 19
partly overcome by the convention that authors are liable to serious retribution for inaccuracy by virtue of  the 
inevitable consequences of  action, karma pala.
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Reported speech is almost always just that. It is 
surprising how frequently English people of  all 
walks of  life conflate reported speech with direct 
observation. So it is difficult to convey to a 
European audience how widely Balinese avoid 
this kind of  confusion. Their precision is 
reminiscent of  those apocryphal stories about 
English analytical philosophers.  20
Two common ways of  dealing with 
inexactitude are the use of  modal-like terms and 
veiled speech. Roughly, the former are terms like 
satmaka ‘as if ’, sakadi ‘like’, menawi ‘apparently’, 
minab or mirib ‘probably’ or ‘possibly’.  Who is 21
entitled to make assertions or compare (masaih) 
events, actions etc. on what occasion without 
qualification deserves further study. It seems to 
mark a claim to authority or expertise, such that 
officials, princes, priests or professionals were 
more likely to make unqualified statements. 
When speakers wished to appear more modest, 
but felt reasonably assured of  what they were 
saying, they tended to use satmaka; and where it 
was open to some doubt sakadi. I was told that, 
used properly, minab, menawi and mirib indicated 
degrees of  likelihood that a statement was 
evident or correct. However the first two terms 
were widely used to qualify the relationship of  
the predicate to its subject, or the degree of  its 
appositeness; while the last three qualified the 
relative likelihood of  the statement being true 
(wiakti). If  the authority to enunciate is 
circumscribed, relative skill at evaluating what 
others say seems far more widely distributed. To 
avoid upsetting the powerful, it is often wise 
though to keep your judgements to yourself.  
A problem of  avoiding lying is that you may 
wish to be ‘economical with the truth’ so as not 
to reveal too much. There are various ways of  
achieving this: some approved, some frowned 
upon. Perhaps the most common is ngèmpèlin, to 
be ambiguous. The word comes from a duck 
putting its webbed foot down, thereby covering 
a great deal of  ground! It may be a bad way of  
speaking, but it is your own fault if  you are 
taken in—caveat auditor!  
Balinese often referred to speech as on a 
continuum from raos nguda, raw or immature 
speech, where you reveal your thoughts 
(ngèdèngang pamineh), to raos wayah, mature or 
oblique speech where you do not. As the former 
suggests, it is typically used by the young or 
foolish. The latter, by contrast, is a virtual index 
of  refinement or intelligence and is thought on 
the whole to come with age and experience. 
Skilled public speakers almost always used it. 
And on such occasions as marriage negotiations 
or visits to royal courts and Brahmana high 
priests it was effectively obligatory. Raos wayah 
might be described as a subtler form of  Sperber 
and Wilson’s contextual implication. It has a 
perfectly clear ostensible reference, but also has 
one or more concealed references, which a 
skilled listener can infer from what is said. As far 
as I can judge, the less that context is required to 
make sense of  an utterance, the better the 
example of  mature speech it is; because context 
introduces ambiguity (ngèmpèlin). Balinese regard 
raos wayah highly. Its use indicates the speaker 
appreciates that the interests and capabilities of  
their audiences are heterogeneous. And it 
suggests a thoughtful and mature person.  
The most direct kind of  speech, widely used 
among family and intimate friends, is the vulgar 
raos babelakasan from belakas, an all-purpose 
agricultural chopper, the flat of  which may be 
used as a hammer—whence the analogy—when 
you speak freely or, in the Balinese idiom, show 
the contents of  your stomach (ngèdèngang isin 
basang). The antithesis is raos makulit, from kulit 
skin, perhaps best glossed as ‘veiled speech’, 
cryptic utterances, songs and the like, which 
requires expertise to unravel. The categories of  
mature and veiled speech overlap, although 
people may disagree as to the exact difference. 
Speech seems to be treated as veiled if  the 
reference is obscure and requires background 
knowledge; and as mature when the listener is 
able to infer beyond the ostensible reference 
from the statement itself. The contexts of  use 
also tend to differ. More thoughtful and senior 
people use mature speech most of  the time even 
!  The fieldwork on which this piece is based was conducted in 1979-80. By the time I rewrote this piece in 20
2014, the advent of  the mass media and modernization with the widespread use of  Indonesian had resulted in 
significant changes in many people’s use of  language.
!  These terms translate poorly as adverbs, because the initial ‘m’ normally indicates a verb form (insofar as 21
these European grammatical categories apply at all). So mirib is often glossed as ‘be like, resemble’ etc. Similarly 
minab frequently takes the verb form minabang tiang, ‘it seems to me’.
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in informal situations. Veiled speech involves 
deliberate indirection, for example when 
criticizing those in power, and so is often used by 
shadow puppeteers and actors. However 
whether speech is considered wayah or not is less 
some intrinsic property of  the utterances than is 
dependent upon the listeners. 
Balinese have a developed vocabulary for 
evaluating speech and writing. So we do not 
necessarily have to import academic models. As 
most written works are in Kawi, reading these 
(ngawacèn and so mabasan, putting into speech) is 
a common practice. Someone must then 
explicate it (ngartiang) in Balinese.  Something 22
similar happens in theatre when the servants 
elaborate in low Balinese what noble characters 
say cryptically in Kawi or refined Balinese. It 
would be tempting to gloss ngartiang as 
‘translate’. However, whether in textual readings 
or in theatre, readers or actors relatively rarely 
search for exact correspondences, but 
paraphrase, elaborate, expatiate, contextualize 
and generally explore the implications.  Skilled 23
actors become famous island-wide for their 
ab i l i ty to ins inuate severa l potent ia l 
interpretations in a single expression, ranging 
from moral argument to contemporary social 
and political commentary. So it is questionable 
how far correspondence or truth conditions are 
what matters in practice. Inferring contextual 
implications is far from straightforward, even to 
audiences who share so much mutual 
knowledge.  
In straight speech (raos nguda) the reference is 
evident, or as villagers would put it, the tetujon of  
the utterance is clear. Now the word tetujon is 
used of  direction, ‘heading towards’ and so the 
aim of  speech—where it is heading.  It would 24
though be wrong to translate straight speech as 
‘what someone has in mind’. When I asked what 
someone’s tetujon was, I was corrected, 
sometimes quite sharply. You cannot know 
someone else’s tetujon, because it implies you 
know where their thinking is ultimately heading 
(tetujon pikayun). I should have asked the aim of  
their speech (tetujon raos) or actions (tetujon 
laksana). 
So how do you know when you might need 
to reflect on what is said? Much depends on the 
circumstances and on the listeners. Rather 
obviously, in public meetings or when matters of  
importance are being discussed, Balinese are less 
inclined to accept what people say at face value. 
If  someone chooses to speak in a village meeting 
for instance, they usually have a reason or 
motive for so doing, which may well go beyond 
the ostensible reference. Much depends on who 
is speaking. There were people whose words I 
was advised to mull over in any situation. 
Well-formed mature speech may offer few 
contextual clues towards its unravelling. 
Deciding whether and how to interpret 
utterances often requires careful consideration 
of  context, the circumstances of  utterance and 
familiarity with the speaker. Now the extent to 
which Western semantic or pragmatic theories 
minimize the role of  listener is striking. A truth-
conditional approach pays the audience scant 
attention. Speech Act Theory fares better, but 
the notions of  illocutionary and perlocutionary 
force, while treating speech as action, stress the 
agency of  the speaker and leave the listener a 
patient who is acted upon. A strength of  the 
Gricean approach adopted by Sperber and 
Wilson is its recognition at least notionally of  the 
involvement—and need to work—of  listeners. 
Unfortunately in this instance the role is 
conceived passively: the listener’s response is 
effectively conditioned, if  not determined, by 
the speaker’s utterance. However ‘in point of  
fact the word is a two-sided act. It is determined 
equally by whose word it is and for whom it is 
meant... A word is territory shared by both 
addresser and addressee, by the speaker and his 
interlocutor’ (Vološinov 1973: 86).  
!  cf. Sanskrit artha: aim, purpose, advantage, utility; object of  the senses; sense, meaning; Kawi maŋartha: 22
interpret.
!  A developed exegetical vocabulary includes, for example, describing or explaining (nerangang), exemplifying 23
(nyontohin, from conto example) or drawing parallels (ngimbayang, from pra(tiw)imba, analogy; from Sanskrit ‘image, 
model, shadow’). Actors and shadow-puppeteers have long been intellectuals and social critics, a potentially 
dangerous role for example during the Suharto era. As elsewhere under politically repressive régimes, actors use 
indirectness, allusion, allegory and so on, which the more sophisticated spectators understand, but such that the 
most obvious interpretation is innocent.
!  cf. Kawi tuju: to go straight to, head for, aim directly at; also to agree with, be in accord with.24
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As we are dealing with practices of  
interpreting, how I was taught to go about 
unravelling utterances is informative. To 
understand speech, you must first fathom (nurah) 
the speaker’s tetujon in saying what they did, and 
also consider whether there is a tetuwek. Tetuwek is 
the noun form of  the root nuwek, to stab or 
pierce, to reveal what lies behind. Loosely this is 
‘the point’; although ‘what is revealed’ might be 
better. If  you decide that what has been said has 
some disguised purpose (tetujon kaengkeb), you 
need to sift the words (nyaringin) carefully to see 
if  there is a tetuwek.  
As Balinese tend to treat speech as an act, 
an account of  ‘meaning’ involves the 
consequences of  both speaking and listening. If  
you understand (ngaresep) where the speech is 
heading and what it reveals to the perceptive 
interlocutor, you have a pikolih (product, result, 
outcome) without which listening is fruitless 
(gabeng).  Finally, if  you realize something from 25
what is said, you have—or experience—suksema 
(see below).  
Obviously few people go to all this trouble 
over most mundane utterances. It would be 
incorrect though to think of  this work of  
unravelling (melut, used also of  peeling a fruit) as 
the preserve of  a small coterie of  local pedants 
or academics manqué. I was frequently taken 
aback in Bali at how often women and men, 
whom their co-villagers dismissed as ignorant, 
used this evaluative vocabulary in daily life.  
The litany of  terms above makes heavy 
going, so let me flesh the argument out with two 
examples, which may make matters clearer. The 
first was a case of  ambiguity (ngèmpèlin) about a 
potentially serious matter. The second was 
judged a fine instance of  oblique speech. 
Example 1:  
An empty oath (or ambiguous speech, raos ngèmpèlin) 
On various occasions Balinese may have to 
swear oaths, for instance when parties to a 
dispute present conflicting statements or public 
property is stolen. A famous oath includes, 
among various forms of  sudden and unpleasant 
death, the threat of  being eaten by a crocodile if  
you lie.  During a temple festival, when no one 26
would admit to absconding with some baskets, 
the question arose of  administering such an 
oath. One skilled public speaker remarked that a 
key clause was ambiguous (ngèmpèlin). Even were 
he guilty, he could quite happily swear to it, 
because its most obvious interpretation was that 
you were prepared to be attacked by a dead 
crocodile—a pretty benign fate.  The oath 27
should have been phrased to state you were 
prepared to be savaged to death by a crocodile, 
had you lied. When I asked if  this were its 
tetujon, it caused people some confusion because 
the words indicated no clear path of  action. The 
purpose in the officials’ minds (tetujon pikayun) 
was obviously the latter; but, as it stood, it was 
an empty (gabeng) oath.  
While we might think the example trivial, 
those present did not. There was fairly 
widespread resentment at the pretension of  the 
Diagram: Ambiguous Speech
The Balinese and 

















(a) Tiang apang sarap 
(antuk) buaya mati. 
May I be savaged 
by a dead 
crocodile!
Artin raos  
(the meaning of  
the utterance)
Or:
(b) Apang tiang mati 
sarap (antuk) buaya. 
May I die (by 
being) savaged by a 
crocodile.
Sané patut karaos  
(What should 
have been said)
!  The metaphors here are partly agricultural. Pikolih is used inter alia of  harvest yield; and unpollinated padi is 25
gabeng.
!  Buaya includes sharks and other large water-based animals. So it is a cultural category, which is part of  shared 26
knowledge and cannot be implied from the context of  a conversation.
!  This fate is reminiscent of  a famous remark delivered by the Labour politician Dennis Healey in the British 27
House of  Commons. He said that being attacked by the mild-manner Minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe, was like 
being savaged by a dead sheep.
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village leaders, which was neatly punctured by 
these remarks. As by-standers explained to me 
the significance of  what was said, perhaps more 
important than the subject matter to hand, is 
how familiar many people were with the 
analytical vocabulary of  speech and its forensic 
use. 
Example 2:  
The behaviour of  a priest 
One day I visited an old Balinese friend 
accompanied by one of  my main informants. In 
the course of  conversation I mentioned that I 
was working with different groups of  Balinese 
villagers to gain a sense of  the diversity and 
range of  local knowledge. I kept a local temple 
priest (pamangku, addressed as Jèro Mangku), 
separate from the others because his knowledge 
was so extensive that others felt shy of  speaking 
and I was not sure how typical he was. My 
friend replied ‘Be careful of  the Jèro Mangku, 
his knowledge is of  the level of  a high priest’. 
We continued chatting for some time before I 
left.  
On the way back, the remark came to mind and 
I asked my informant what had it been about. 
He gave me a curious look and said he had 
wondered whether I had understood (ngaresep). 
He seemed pleased that I had realized 
something was afoot and said that at last I was 
learning how to reflect on what people were 
telling me. It was, he added, a good example of  
raos wayah because it was very clear. He then 
explained how to set about unravelling the 
utterance. As it seemed complicated, I privately 
thought the informant might just be giving me a 
virtuoso exhibition of  his hermeneutic skills. So 
I asked several other villagers separately what 
they thought only to be given almost exactly the 
same explication. 
What my friend said was that the temple priest’s 
knowledge was of  the order of  a Brahmana 
High Priest, the latter being the repositories of  
much erudite knowledge (1a; see diagram 
below). The unstated implication was that, 
although the man was only a village priest, his 
knowledge was sufficiently superior to other 
villagers’ that I should beware of  confusing his 
account with theirs. However, if  I reflected on 
what was said I could discern a purpose (tetujon) 
beyond the ostensible referent. To make matters 
simpler the speaker had even included the 
phrase ingen-ingen, ‘be careful’, ‘pay attention’ 
which invited his interlocutor to consider, and 
sift the speech (nyaring raos) to discover the 
purpose in saying it (2b). First I was being told 
to beware of  the 
p r i e s t ( 3 c ) ; a n d 
further I was invited 
to reflect on possible 
parallels between the 
temple priest and 
High Priests (3d), to 
establish why caution 
was advocated. To do 
so, I had to si f t 
through what was 
s a i d a g a i n ( 4 ) , 
f o c u s i n g o n 
‘ b e w a r e ’ ( 4 e ) t o 
compare what I knew 
about the priest with 
what I knew of  High 
Priests. High Priests 
have the reputation 
of  ingeniously, but unostentatiously, extracting 
large donations from their supplicants (4f), while 
making a show of  selflessness. The temple 
priest, while very clever, was often accused 
locally of  being greedy. The point (tetuwek) of  the 
initial statement was now revealed, according to 
my informants. I should beware of  the temple 
priest because his actions showed that he had a 
bad character behind his principled veneer. So I 
acquired (mapikolih) something useful from the 
exchange and with it suksema. Suksema defies 
translation. While it has become a popular term 
for ‘Thank you’, in Sanskrit it signifies what is 
subtle, intangible; and in Kawi what is not 
normally perceptible. So it connotes the 
antithesis of  the coarse and material. Suksema 
seems to suggest an aspect of  your being 
following a completed action, most usually if  it 
was beneficial or productive.   28
* 
!  Cf. Sanskrit suksma: minute, fine, intangible, acute, subtle, keen; Kawi: subtle, of  subtle matter, ethereal, 28
unsubstantial i.e. not accessible to the usual organs of  perception, but perceptible to those gifted with 
supernatural powers, the invisible essence of  what is sensually perceptible; the state of  a deity not manifesting 
itself  in material form.
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from not really 
listening to what  
is being said?
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The original exchange’s full significance was 
lost on the naïve anthropologists, but my friend 
knew my informant well enough to guess that he 
would probably explain it to me. If  the 
presentation seems tortuous, it is partly because 
I have tried to keep to how the statement was 
explained to me. It also suggests the sort of  
cultural learning needed to fathom what people 
from another society say to one another. To 
what extent does the easy confidence with which 
some anthropologists explain Balinese 
‘symbolism’ stem from not really listening to 
what is being said? Is it coincidental that 
Clifford Geertz whose analyses of  Balinese 
symbolism are the benchmarks for interpretive 
anthropology subsequently admitted that his 
research was undertaken in Indonesian (1991: 
606)? The implications for scholarship are 
intriguing.  29
The consensus was that the warning was a 
good example of  oblique speech because it did 
not rely on context, which might have made it 
ambiguous. It was melah waspadang, beautifully 
clear, understandable and so likely to be 
!  It was left open whether the Jèro Mangku was bad because he was after money or for some other reason. If  29
you understand (ngaresep) the tetuwek, you have an initial result (pikolih) and so may feel suksema. You may continue 
to establish in what way the man has a bad character and so have further pikolih and suksema because you are 
aware of  a danger of  which you were not before. Two word plays confirm that it is wise to reflect. First, tingkat, 
‘level’ or ‘standard’, is Indonesian, but is virtual homonym of  tingkah (both Indonesian and Balinese), moral 
behaviour. Second kawikanan, wisdom, knowledge, cleverness is ambivalent in Bali (as is ‘clever’ in English). 
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Diagram: Mature Speech
1. Utterance  
    (Raos)
a. (Be) careful of  the Jèro Mangku, his knowledge is of  the level of  a High 
Priest. 
(Ingen-ingen ring Jèro Mangku, kawikanan dané tingkat Padanda.)
2. If  you sift the utterance… 
    (Yèning nyaring raos...)
b. Beware ⇒ Inspect what has just been said.  
(Ingen-ingen → maréksa sané karaos.)
3. The aim of  the utterance 
    (Tetujon raos)
c. Beware ⇒ Jèro Mangku.  
(Ingen-ingen → Jèro Mangku) 
d. The utterance’s purpose is that the listener should examine the priest’s 
actions and consider what relationship they bear to ⇒ High Priests.  
(Tetujon raos mangda sané mireng maréksa laksanan dané kantos mikayunin napi 
pasuwitran punika ring kawikanan → Padanda.)
4. Sift again 
    (Nyaringin malih)
e. Beware! Sift again to compare the circumstances.  
(Ingen-ingen. Mangda nyaihang kawèntenan ring kawèntenan;) 
f. High Priests are often clever (in the bad sense). They want money and ask 
for gifts but without it being obvious.  
(Kawikanan Padanda sering kaon, makayun jinah jaga ngambil sesari sakéwanten ‘ten 
ngenah.)
5. The point, what is revealed 
    (Tetuwek)
g. Beware of  the Jèro Mangku because his character as exemplified in his 
behaviour is bad.  
(Ingen-ingen ring Jèro Mangku santukan perah dané kaon.)
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understood.  How Balinese villagers draw 30
inferences differs from Sperber and Wilson’s 
account. Unravelling utterances does not 
depend on otherwise obscure remarks or 
exchanges; and interpretation may eschew 
recourse to the context of  utterance. Crucially, 
listeners play an active role in deciding what 
utterances are about. Pace Sperber and Wilson, 
it is hard to see how to unravel the remark 
without much shared knowledge, including 
learning how to use language and to listen to 
what is said.  
In a hierarchical society like Bali, the point 
of  veiled speech is precisely that such knowledge 
is differentially distributed and only partly 
shared. So are the egalitarian presuppositions on 
which Sperber and Wilson’s argument rests as 
unproblematically cross-cultural as they assume? 
If  we turn to indigenous literature, matters 
become more complicated still. How to interpret 
sources dealing with the past is not self-evident. 
There was a heated argument between Dutch 
scholars as to whether the dynastic chronicles 
(babad) of  Java and Bali should be read as a 
quasi-factual historical record (Pigeaud 1960-63) 
or whether the presuppositions behind their 
writing differed so much that such a reading was 
fatally flawed (Berg 1965; Zoetmulder 1965).  31
The latter view, once derided, has subsequently 
been borne out by ethnographic accounts of  
how Indonesians use such works (Becker 1979; 
Errington 1979; Vickers 1991). Is it not slightly 
odd though to decree what written works are 
about prior to asking how they are used? 
How though do most people encounter 
texts? Usually it is through theatre. In Java and 
Bali a play, which lasts for several hours or even 
nights, is extemporized around a few sentences 
from a literary work. Such performances are 
remarkable tours de force by an ensemble of  actors 
working together in an unrepeatable event. 
Performers often spoke of  such occasions as re-
enacting or bringing to life what is written for a 
particular audience on a given occasion. How 
adequate is a theory of  language if  it cannot 
begin to address such popular usage?  
Reviewing Balinese usage, even words for 
meaning imply action: tetuwek is about pointing, 
tetujon is about moving towards a goal. The stress 
is on doing: explicating (ngartiang), exemplifying 
(nyontohin), sifting (nyaringin) or unravelling (melut). 
Ambiguity, ngèmpèlin is a verb (‘ambiguate’); 
while to understand, ngaresep, is a ‘two-sided 
word’, ‘entering, penetrating’ and ‘entered, 
penetrated’ (Zoetmulder 1982: 1543). Rather 
than being about abstract objects like meaning, 
Balinese talk about what is involved in speaking, 
listening and interpreting as a situated practice. 
Have I not overstated my case? After all, is 
not the most sophisticated theory vulnerable to 
ethnographic quibbles? Am I not demanding of  
theory a capacity to deal with the everyday that 
is unrealistic? Consider then this critique of  the 
postulates of  linguistics. 
The theory of  the performative sphere, and the 
broader sphere of  the illocutionary, has had 
three important and immediate consequences: 
(1) It has made it impossible to conceive of  
language as a code, since a code is the condition 
of  possibility for all explanation. It has also 
made it impossible to conceive of  speech as the 
communication of  information: to order, 
question, promise, or affirm is not to inform 
someone about a command, doubt, engagement, 
or assertion but to effectuate these specific, 
immanent, and necessarily implicit acts. (2) It 
has made it impossible to define semantics, 
syntactics, or even phonematics as scientific 
zones of  language independent of  pragmatics. 
Pragmatics ceases to be a ‘trash heap,’ pragmatic 
determinations cease to be subject to the 
alternative: fall outside language, or answer to 
explicit conditions that syntacticize and 
semanticize pragmatic determinations. Instead, 
pragmatics becomes the presupposition behind 
all of  the other dimensions and insinuates itself  
into everything. (3) It makes it impossible to 
maintain the distinction between language and 
speech because speech can no longer be defined 
simply as the extrinsic and individual use of  a 
primary signification, or the variable application 
of  a preexisting syntax. Quite the opposite, the 
meaning and syntax of  language can no longer 
be defined independently of  the speech acts they 
presuppose (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 77-78). 
Balinese invite us to go still further. Speech is 
inseparable from other acts, because meaning 
can only be judged from its consequences. A 
fine-grained analysis of  interpretation is not 
sub-theoretical or unphilosophical; it just starts 
!  Waspada is both understandable and likely to be understood.30
!  The debate recently took a new twist when it transpired that most, if  not all, Balinese babad were twentieth 31
century retrojections (Adrian Vickers, personal communication).
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from quite different presuppositions that are 
better suited to a study of  practice.  32
The Future of  an Illusion? 
What can we conclude from this initial 
inquiry into Balinese interpretive practices? 
How adequate are the linguistic models 
considered? After all, it is always possible to 
make sense of  the ethnography using different 
interpretive schemes or translational manuals. 
What is the bearing of  this inquiry on our 
understanding of  Balinese society? What are the 
implications for the cross-cultural study of  
interpretation and meaning? And, insofar as an 
ethnography of  semantic practice suggests new 
ways of  approaching interpretation and 
meaning, how might this require us to rethink 
existing approaches to European societies? 
As for Truth-Conditional semantics, 
Balinese expect intelligible speech to refer to the 
world; and they recognize a difference between 
the coherence of  utterances and their 
truthfulness. The meaning of  sentences can be 
read as being guaranteed if, and only if, they are 
true. They also worry about sentences where 
they cannot determine what is wiakti (cf. 
Hacking 1975: 153). However existing accounts 
of  truth-conditions do not correspond to 
Balinese ideas of  what is manifest.  Nor does 33
the distinction between sakala and niskala fit the 
dichotomy of  material and mental worlds. It 
also requires stretching the notion of  meaning to 
the point of  meaninglessness. To Balinese, 
stories and texts only become meaningful by 
virtue of  being read, sung, paraphrased or 
performed; but without engaged listeners or 
spectators nothing significant can take place. So 
the efficacy of  a speech act depends on it having 
an outcome for the audience, who are part-
agents in the event. 
At first sight a speech act approach copes 
better. The locutionary, or propositional, force 
of  an utterance could be compared in straight 
speech to daging raos, the content of  the speech; 
and, in oblique speech, to the point tetuwek. The 
tetujon would be the aim of  saying something, its 
illocutionary force; and the pikolih, the 
perlocutionary force of  the utterance (Austin 
1975; Searle 1971). As Balinese distinguish 
between material and immaterial consequences 
of  speech, pikolih would be the manifest or 
tangible, and suksema the non-manifest or 
intangible, outcome of  the utterance. A problem 
for Relevance Theory is that it is impossible to 
infer relevant context without prior knowledge. 
Nor can you predict how Balinese argue without 
grasping their epistemology. Sperber and Wilson 
would never be alerted to oblique speech at all 
because statements do make ostensible sense. As 
it stands, for Bali Relevance Theory actually 
guarantees miscommunication. Even if  
theoretical linguists and philosophers are 
satisfied with the rigorous logical conditions of  
such arguments, they are of  precious little use to 
anthropologists and other scholars who wish to 
study how Balinese and others set about 
interpreting and understanding one another. 
Does this inquiry into their interpretive 
practices change how we might set about 
understanding Balinese society? Recourse to use 
is not a panacea, as it is contingent on 
circumstances. Also Balinese explain what they 
do by invoking concepts that are mutually 
defined, like suksema. So we seem to be dealing 
with a Quinean account of  knowledge as ‘a 
man-made fabric which impinges on experience 
only along the edges’ (1953: 42). Does my 
approach then lose in explanatory scope what it 
might gain in analytical or descriptive power? 
But why should such situation-sensitive uses of  
communication in a broad sense admit of  a 
single encompassing explanation, as in the 
human sciences the latter is often an intellectual 
Chimaera? Balinese quotidian interpretive 
practices differ sufficiently from both common 
!  Deleuze ‘calls his kind of  philosophy “pragmatics” because its goal is the invention of  concepts that do not 32
add up to a system of  belief  or an architecture of  propositions that you either enter or you don’t, but instead 
pack a potential in the way a crowbar in a willing hand envelops an energy of  prying’ (Massumi 1987: xv). 
!  On a broader issue of  truth, Hollis and Lukes have argued that anthropologists taking my tack ‘must surely 33
believe that they can succeed, at least in principle, in identifying what their subjects believe’ (1982b: 10). I have 
no reason to hold that Balinese do have one true set of  beliefs about meaning. In their own terms, such beliefs 
are niskala and therefore hard to pin down. Balinese are not somehow passively mirroring collective 
representations. They are asserting, pondering and discussing questions of  how to interpret what is said and 
done in particular situations. How are we to determine the correct translation for what is not a transcendent set 
of  ideas at all, but rather shared practices?
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sense expectations and linguistic models that 
failing to take them properly into account looks 
at best lazy, at worst plain hegemonic. However 
such an analysis is not enough in itself. 
There exists a very strong … idea that in order 
better to understand a foreign culture, one must 
enter into it, forgetting one’s own, and view the 
world through the eyes of  this foreign culture. 
Of  course, a certain entry as a living being into a 
foreign culture … is a necessary part of  the 
process of  understanding it; but if  this were the 
only aspect it would merely be duplication and 
would not entail anything new or enriching. 
Creative understanding does not renounce itself, 
its own place in time, its own culture; and it 
forgets nothing. In order to understand, it is 
immensely important for the person who 
understands to be located outside the object of  
his or her creative understanding - in time, in 
space, in culture (Bakhtin 1986b: 6-7).  
The choice is not between Balinese or Euro-
American academic accounts, nor treating 
others as raw material for the Western mind to 
digest (Bateson & Mead 1942). Instead I prefer 
the idea of  a creative dialogue in which 
indigenous usage and theoretical accounts are 
held in an irresolvable tension such that 
understanding addresses not only what Balinese 
do, but also reflexively turns a critical eye onto 
our own academic and quotidian usage.  
Does not treating practice as the object of  
study threaten analytical coherence?  After all, 34
what occurs in actuality is often contingent. This 
is not a problem unique to practice. Any 
approach that seeks system or structure has to 
select evidence and discount chance or awkward 
events. Here practice arguably fares better (for a 
definition, see Hobart 2010: 63). Under 
conditions of  double discursivity, we need to 
distinguish the practices through which people 
organize the events, actions and activities that 
happen around them from the practices of  
scholars, which analyze the former. If  carried 
out non-trivially, studying people’s practices 
involves studying how they set about articulating 
their worlds. Linguistic (and indeed some 
anthropological) approaches worry me insofar as 
they fail to appreciate the constitutive role of  
local practices of  encouraging, forbidding, 
disciplining, enunciating, demonstrating, 
representing, arguing and so on—in short, 
‘articulating’ in its cultural studies sense.  To 35
articulate successfully necessarily requires 
disarticulating rival accounts. So articulation 
provides a means of  studying what other 
approaches find hard, namely how silences and 
absences come about and are maintained. 
There is nothing haphazard in studying 
practice. On the contrary, it enables us to 
analyze crit ical ly not only indigenous 
procedures for controlling, classifying, ordering 
and distributing what happens, but also how 
these relate to the procedures scholars use in 
their research and writing. If  a new approach is 
to be taken seriously, presumably it must be able 
to account for what previous approaches could 
and also address what these latter could not 
either adequately or at all (cf. Kuhn 1970). On 
that score I think that practice succeeds well. No 
approach is, or should be, the final solution; and 
inevitably further work wil l highl ight 
shortcomings. However, insofar as practice 
offers a more nuanced way of  engaging with 
how Balinese articulate and argue over how they 
speak and what they do, it is useful. 
Does my present inquiry change how we 
might set about interpreting Balinese society? I 
!  The difference between my approach and, say, that of  Rosaldo (1982) should, I hope, be clear. To her, 34
practice is reducible to the codes, rules and categories of  an unproblematic universal academic framework. By 
contrast I am arguing not only that practice is not so reducible, but that such systems require rethinking as 
practices of  claiming, questioning, denying and so forth in the circumstances in which people invoke them for 
different reasons. For a discussion of  some of  the philosophical issues, see Couldry & Hobart 2010.
!  Articulation is a powerful concept drawn from cultural studies (Laclau & Mouffe 1985; Slack 1996). My 35
suggestion is hardly radical. Much of  Foucault’s later work was concerned with practices in this sense. Among 
these were ‘internal procedures, since discourses themselves exercise their own control; procedures which 
function rather as principles of  classification, of  ordering, of  distribution, as if  this time another dimension of  
discourse had to be mastered: that of  events and chance’. He noted three in particular. These are ‘commentary’, 
the procedures for organizing utterances, acts and events. ‘Rarefaction’ as ‘a principle of  grouping of  discourses, 
conceived as the unity and origin of  their meanings, as the focus of  their coherence’. And ‘discipline’ which 
Foucault defined ‘by a domain of  objects, a set of  methods, a corpus of  propositions considered to be true: a 
play of  rules and definitions, of  techniques and instruments’ (1981: 56, 58, 59). Here I have been concerned 
primarily with practices of  commenting and disciplining.
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think it does. It throws a question mark over 
the hegemony by which Euro-American 
categories of  judgement replace, rather than 
are in dialogue with, Balinese. It is a warning 
against selecting material that fits pre-
conceived frameworks by imposing a foreign 
discourse or metaphysics, which neatly 
disarticulates what people say and do in the 
name of  academic authority. Let me be clear 
about what I am attempting. It is not simply a 
descriptive ethnography of  speaking or 
communicating through a more fine-grained 
analysis of  the differences in how people 
articulate the world according to race, class, 
gender, religion, generation or other possible 
distinctions that may matter in different 
societies. Instead I question the convenient 
as sumpt ion that o ther s ’ prac t ices o f  
understanding may necessarily be adequately 
explained or understood using ‘universal’ or 
‘objective’ criteria.  Such claims are power-36
laden. They exnominate (Barthes 1973: 139) 
and naturalize the class, ethnic and cultural 
backgrounds of  the experts who enunciate. As 
Fiske put it succinctly: ‘objectivity is the 
“unauthored” voice of  the bourgeoisie’ (1987: 
289). By contrast I prefer a strong critical 
approach, which requires not just analyzing 
what others say and do, but simultaneously 
reflecting critically on our own working 
presuppositions in so doing. If  the result is 
uncomfortable and unsettling, so be it. 
In conclusion, perhaps it is hardly 
surprising that theoretical linguists have found 
structure so universally. Generations of  
schoolmasters and schoolmistresses have been 
beat ing—of ten l i t e ra l l y—g rammat ica l 
structure into unwilling pupils. So the history 
of  practice may be at least as pertinent as 
postulated unconscious rules. However a 
residual linguistic imperialism holds ‘that if  the 
native does not share most of  our beliefs and 
wants, he is just not engaged in human 
discourse, and is at best sub-human. (The 
native has heard that one before too)’ (Hacking 
1975: 149). The study of  interpretive practice 
reveals a residual intellectual insularity. The 
English, who are its past masters, used to say 
that there is little worthwhile beyond the 
wharves of  Dover. It reminds me of  the 
apocryphal newspaper headline:  
* 
THICK FOG IN CHANNEL, 
EUROPE CUT OFF 
* 
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